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INTRODUCTION
The command responsibility doctrine criminalizes a failure by a
superior to prevent or punish crimes by subordinates.' The modem
formulation of this doctrine bases criminal liability on a minimum
mens rea of negligence and an actus reus of omission.2 This Article
proposes that such a combination of negligence and omission is
incompatible with a deontological retributive theory of criminal law
that values the individual as the necessary unit of moral
accountability.3 Under this doctrine, liability is established without
conduct that exhibits strong individualized choice and without a
mental element that reflects a guilty mind.4 As such, it persists as a
utilitarian tool of victor's justice favoring deterrence of crimes and
the punishment of superiors over the principle of individualized
fault.'
International lawmakers and scholars must concern themselves
with realigning the doctrine with the notion of individualized fault, a
bedrock principle of criminal law.6 Absent such concern, support for
international criminal justice may erode as the discord between
principles of liability and legal doctrines raises doubt regarding the
justness and efficacy of the emerging framework of international

1. See Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina and Beyond: Command

Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 165,
168-70 (2000) (defining "command responsibility" and explaining that the doctrine
can be traced as far back as 1474, as well as to early United States military
practice).
2. See infra Part II.B.1-2 (describing the mens rea and actus reus of the
command responsibility doctrine).
3. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining that the combination of negligence and

omission is problematic because it assigns liability without a strong element of
fault and independent choice manifested in an action).
4. See id. (noting that the command responsibility doctrine requires almost no
evidence of individualized responsibility).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYo WAR
CRIMES TRIAL 67 (1971) (discussing how the command responsibility doctrine was

used after World War II to hold Japanese military leaders responsible for the acts
of their subordinates).
6. See infra Part II.B.4 (explaining that recklessness or willful ignorance
should be the minimum mens rea required to have some individualization of fault).
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criminal law. I Admittedly, the tradition of positivism and the
prevailing dynamic of compromise in international lawmaking may
hinder such a realignment. Nonetheless, the international legal
community must give greater attention to deriving criminal doctrines
from first principles and rooting them in a philosophy of law, rather
than succumbing to the appeal of utilitarian objectives.8
Building upon an historical overview of the origins and evolution
of the command responsibility doctrine, this Article provides a
normative critique of the elements of command responsibility, and
suggests an approach that international legislators should adopt to
improve the doctrine in light of its normative failings, and the
peculiar nature of international law.9 Part I explores the history of the
command responsibility doctrine and its eventual codification. In
Part II, the merits of the doctrine are examined from the perspective
of the retributive theory. Reasons why individualized fault has not
become the standard are explored in Part III. Finally, the Conclusion
calls on international lawmakers to reflect on their approach to
lawmaking and to adopt a coherent philosophy to guide future
efforts.

I. AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
The origins of command responsibility are ancient, with a long
history of development and practice in the laws of various nations. 10
As early as the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius articulated the

7. See Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 470-71 (2001) (noting that the principle of culpability is so
widely recognized by the international community that it almost serves as a source
of public international law).
8. See infra Part III (explaining why international law has failed to adequately
base criminal doctrines on first principles and what the consequences of such a
failure may be).
9. See infra Conclusion (suggesting that international lawmakers should
concern themselves with advancing an understanding of a common philosophy of
law and identifying problematic philosophical issues to provide a framework for
rehabilitating international criminal law).
10. See L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in InternationalHumanitarian
Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 320-28 (1995) (discussing the
historical development of the doctrine from fifteenth-century France to World War
II).
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basic precept that a community, or its rulers, may be held responsible
for the crime if they know of it and do not prevent it when they could
and should prevent it. 11Command responsibility emerged as a
coherent international legal doctrine more recently.12 While receiving
some treatment in the Conference of Versailles, used to indict Kaiser
Wilhelm II after the First World War, 3 it matured as a theory of
international criminal responsibility in the international tribunals
following the Second World War. 14 In the Tokyo trials, the Tribunals
used the theory of command responsibility to hold commanders
liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by
subordinates. 5 A complete analysis of command responsibility
11.

See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 523 (Francis W. Kelsey

trans., 1925) (1625) (discussing the classical background of a community's duty in
certain criminal acts).
12. See generally Romagoza v. Garcia, No. 99-8364 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2002)
(finding that two Salvadorian generals should pay $54.6 million to three
individuals who were tortured by the Salvadorian military during the country's
civil war based on the command responsibility doctrine on the grounds that the
generals allowed a climate to exist in which the military could torture and kill
unarmed civilians), at www.cja.org/cases/RomagozaDocs/RomagozaVerdict.htm
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004); see also Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.
2002) (examining the command responsibility doctrine in the context of
international legal precedent, yet finding that two El Salvadorian generals were not
legally responsible for the abduction, torture, and murder of three nuns and a
layperson under the doctrine because the generals did not exercise "effective
control". over their subordinates).
13. See, e.g., Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace
Conference, Mar. 19, 1919, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 117 (1920) (holding that highranking officers are liable to criminal prosecution for "offences against the laws and
customs of war or the laws of humanity").
14. See infra Part I.B (discussing the codification of the command
responsibility doctrine in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of
1949).
15. See MINEAR, supra note 5, at 67 (noting that the Tokyo tribunals did not
accuse any defendants of personally committing an atrocity, but separate tribunals
prosecuted and condemned over 900 of them for committing atrocities). The
prosecution instead charged the defendants at the Tokyo tribunals with three
separate counts: Count 53-conspiring to "order, authorize, and permit" Japanese
officials "frequently and habitually to commit" breaches of the laws and customs
of war; Count 54 (derived from the Nuremburg trials)-ordering, authorizing and
permitting such acts; and Count 55 (new at these tribunals)-deliberately and
recklessly disregarding "their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the
observance and prevent breaches" of the laws and customs of war. Id.
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requires an evaluation of the historical development and current
treatment of the modem doctrine.
A. EMERGENCE OF THE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE IN
THE TOKYO TRIBUNALS: A LEGACY OF VICTOR'S JUSTICE

The Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita serves as perhaps the
most frequently cited World War II command responsibility case, and
certainly the most famous of the Tokyo Tribunal cases.' 6 While the
Yamashita trial affirmed the principle of individual accountability for

crimes against international law advanced during the Nuremburg
trials, 7 it was also the first international war crimes trial to find a
commanding officer criminally liable without any direct evidence
linking him affirmatively to the crimes committed by his

subordinates. 8 Articulating what is now regarded as the doctrine of
command responsibility, the Yamashita trial included a charge of
"negative criminality,"' 9 or liability for a failure to act.2 0

16. See TIM MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS
18 (2001) (noting that historians and others have heard more about the Yamashita
trial than the entire trials effort in Tokyo for various reasons, including the
attention of the world press, general public knowledge of Yamashita's successful
military campaigns, and General Douglas MacArthur's showmanship and attention
to the case ); see also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEYOND THE
NUREMBURG LEGACY 6 (1997) (calling the legal actions taken by the international

community after World War II "the watershed for the development of the principle
of accountability for human rights abuses").
17. See ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 6 (1962) (noting that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
accused a wide cross section of individuals, including civilians, of crimes between
1939 and 1945).
18. See RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND

RESPONSIBILITY xi (1982) (explaining that the first use of new
streamlined legal methods and charges based on a failure to exercise command
responsibility sparked a legal controversy). But see Smidt, supra note 1, at 169-70
(claiming that command responsibility can be traced as far back as 1474, as well as
to early United States military practice).
19. See MINEAR, supra note 5, at 67 (discussing that the inclusion of "negative
criminality" in Count 55 almost indicated an admission of the difficulty of
convicting the defendants under Count 54, which charged that the defendants
actually "ordered, authorized, and permitted" the illegal acts).
20. See LAEL, supra note 18, at xi (noting that the Yamashita trial was the first
war crimes trial to charge an officer for failing to fulfill his responsibilities without
COMMAND
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This theory of liability appealed to the prosecution because it had no
direct evidence that Yamashita participated in or had knowledge of the
atrocities committed by soldiers under his command. 21 While
international lawmakers had previously considered this theory of
liability, they did not widely accept it before the Tokyo Tribunals.22 In
fact, the United States representatives to the 1919 Commission of
Responsibilities at Versailles explicitly rejected negative criminality.23
These representatives intimated that liability was improper without an
overt criminal act, or knowledge of the criminal acts of others, and
proof of the power to prevent their commission.24
In his petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Yamashita argued that the
laws of war did not recognize negative criminality, and, therefore,
excluded his case from the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 25 The Court
rejected this argument, claiming that the charge fulfilled the general
purpose of the law of war because a commanding general's duty is to
control his troops in order to protect civilian populations and
prisoners of war.26 The Court cited the Hague Convention of 1907,27
any evidence that linked him to the crime).
21. See MINEAR, supra note 5, at 68 (explaining that the tribunal held the
Japanese military officials accountable for the acts of their subordinates despite the
fact that the defendants lacked knowledge of their subordinates' acts).
22. See id. at 72 (noting that the American Government had rejected the
concept of negative criminality at Versailles in 1919, as did the French
representative in London in 1945).
23. See id. (relaying that the United States did not even believe that negative
criminality existed).
24. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International
Law, VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR: REPORTS OF THE MAJORITY
AND DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919 72 (1919) (noting

the opposition of the American representatives to punishing a person "who failed
to prevent, to put an end to, or to repress violations of the laws of customs of
war").
25. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,14 (1946) (noting that Yamashita claimed
that since the charge against him did not allege the commission or direction of
commission of acts against the civilian population of the Philippines, the
prosecution made no actual charge against him); see also MINEAR, supra note 5, at
69-70 (noting a Tokyo tribunal justice's opinion that Yamashita could not
reconcile Count 55 (negative criminality) with the charter).
26. See id. at 15 (asserting that "the law of war presupposes that its violation is
to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are
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as well as Article 26 of the Geneva Convention of 1929,28 to support
its position that commanders have affirmative duties and
29
responsibilities for their subordinates under international law.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Murphy criticized the Court's ruling,
stating that war atrocities "have a dangerous tendency to call forth
primitive impulses of vengeance and retaliation among the victimized
peoples."3 Justice Murphy also asserted that the Tribunal based
Yamashita's conviction on standards created unilaterally by the
victors, rather than standards evinced from international law.3
The Tokyo Tribunal's acceptance of negative criminality as an
established legal theory was questionable, considering its limited
treatment in international legal documents and lack of customary
recognition. 2 Even more troubling was the Tribunal's finding of guilt
without precisely defining or applying the evidence to constitutive
elements of negative criminality.33 The charge made no attempt to
define the essential elements of negative criminality, and the Tribunal
failed to state the mens rea standard it chose to apply.34
to some extent responsible for their subordinates").
27. See Annex to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 19, 1907, § 1, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295 (declaring that the treaty
applies to armed forces "commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates").
28. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, art. 26, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092 (declaring it the
responsibility of commanding officers to insure the execution of the treaty).
29. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15 (asserting that these conventions of
international law proved a long-established duty on the part of a commanding
officer).
30. See id. at 29 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that war atrocities are
the byproducts of war, but asserting that revenge is not the correct response).
31. See id. at 35 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that defining the duty of a
commanding officer under battle conditions requires difficult calculations that
become untrustworthy when made by the victor).
32. See Smidt, supra note 1, at 175 (asserting that the plain language of the
international statutes cited by the Supreme Court require that a commander
actively participate in the perpetration of war crimes).
33. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 53 n.17 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the majority's definition of the crime and, specifically, whether knowledge
must be proved, was ambiguous).
34. See id. (asserting that the prosecution failed to indicate whether it accused
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While General Yamashita was probably morally culpable as a
military commander,35 his conviction was not based on a principled
approach to criminal justice. 3 6 The Tribunal's judgment was an
example of judicially-sanctioned vengeance, rather than justifiable
retribution.3 7 As such, the doctrine of command responsibility began
as an instrument of victor's justice,38 rather than as a well-considered
theory of criminality.39
B. THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF
1949: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CODIFIED

The doctrine of command responsibility has gained widespread
recognition since its application in the Yamashita trial. 4' Adopted in
1977, Article 86 of Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of

Yamashita of knowing that subordinates committed the crimes, whether he failed
to prevent those crimes, or whether he failed to discover that the crimes occurred).
35. See CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
1014 n.39 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY] (suggesting
that the Tribunal decided, based on the widespread nature of the crimes committed
by the soldiers under his command, that it was likely that Yamashita was aware of
the crimes and failed to prevent or punish them).
36. See MINEAR, supra note 5, at 73 (emphasizing that the Tokyo Tribunal
agreed with the prosecutor's interpretation of international law on every issue in
the case, and declaring that a different decision by the Tribunal on just one of the
issues would have changed the nature of the entire case).
37. See JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, 'MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL
10 (1954) (explaining that one who is "embroiled in passion" when
considering a case is likely to pursue vengeance rather than a just punishment).
38. See MINEAR, supra note 5, at 179-80 (setting forth the thesis that the Tokyo
trial did not have a strong foundation and that it was procedurally flawed, and
further asserting that the Tokyo trial was a "kind of morality play").
39. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 322 (I.C.T.Y. Mar. 3,
2000) (suggesting that the World War II trials developed the standard that a
commander is liable for the crimes of his subordinates if the commander should
have known about the crimes or should have made an effort to know about them),
(last
available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgement/index.htm
visited Oct. 19, 2004).
40. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 1006 (recognizing that, although there
were some convictions based on the failure to act during the trials following World
War II, Article 86 first codified a violation of international law due to an
omission).
CRIMES
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1949 ("Additional Protocol") 4 ' was the first international treaty to
codify the doctrine, creating an affirmative duty to repress grave
breaches of international law, and imposing penal and disciplinary
responsibility on superiors for breaches committed by subordinates.
Article 86 states:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other
breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a
failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal
disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had
information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their
power to prevent or repress the breach.42

Based on the statutory language, Article 86 punishes a failure to
prevent or repress where a superior has information that should have
enabled him to conclude that breaches of the Convention occurred or
were about to occur.43

Commentary on the Additional Protocol reveals that Article 86
includes some controversial issues.4a The imposition of liability on
commanders for an omission rather than an action makes it more
difficult to define the limits of a commander's responsibility.45 During
drafting, the representatives to the Convention objected most strongly

41. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, art. 86, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1428-29, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol].
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (describing the controversy
over assigning liability for an actus reus that is an omission and a mens rea of
negligence).
45. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 1009-10 (listing examples of breaches
of law that result from a failure to act and discussing the challenges in defining a
commander's duty to act in the context of international law).
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to the imposition of liability for a failure to act where the mens rea is
negligence.46
Although the language of the statute clearly indicates that the mens
rea requirement is met where superiors "had information that should
have enabled them to conclude" 47 that a subordinate was committing
or had committed a breach,48 the commentary relates the delegates'
49
ultimate conclusion that a mere negligence standard is too lOW.
Every case of negligence, however, is not necessarily criminal.50 It
appears that the drafters of the Additional Protocol intended a mens
rea that approached recklessness or willful blindness, rather than
mere negligence.51 The drafters wanted to ensure that a superior who
"deliberately wishes to remain ignorant" would not avoid criminal
liability.52
While the intent of the drafters is reasonably clear, it is not certain
that a recklessness standard will prevail in practice.53 As seen in the
Yamashita trials, zealous victors may be tempted to manipulate
54
ambiguous standards to achieve objectives they perceive to be just.
Although the legislative history of Article 86 may prescribe an
46. See id. at 1011-12 (noting that there is no provision in the Convention that
defines negligent conduct as criminal).
47. See Additional Protocol, supra note 41, art. 86 (stating that when an officer
has this information, the officer is responsible for the actions of his subordinates).
48. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 1012 (reciting one delegate's
conclusion that the language in Article 86 should have indicated that any breach
resulted from negligence).
49. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (clarifying that the negligence
must be malicious in order for it to be considered criminal).
50. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 1012 (contending that for negligence
to be criminal, it must be practically the same as malicious intent).
51. See id. at 1015 (asserting that a superior has a duty to take both preventive
and repressive measures to stop a breach of the law of armed conflict but
recognizing that restrictions are placed on the types of action required because a
superior cannot necessarily prevent every breach of law).
52. See id. (stating that a superior cannot absolve himself of responsibility by
claiming ignorance of reports addressed to him, the tactical situation, the levels of
training and instruction of subordinates, or the character traits of subordinates).
53. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 128 (suggesting that in practice
the difference between strict liability and negligence could be small).
54. See MINEAR, supra note 5, at 178 (alluding to elements of unfairness in the
trial).
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elevated mens rea, the statutory language can easily be interpreted to
require only an objective negligence standard.55
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA

In the wake of the human rights atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia, the international community sought an ad hoc criminal
statute that would allow for the prosecution of those who orchestrated
the atrocities, as well as those who carried out the violations. 6 Article
7(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") provides as follows:
[t]he fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
measures to prevent
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
57
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

Despite the debate raised during the command responsibility
doctrine's initial codification in the Additional Protocol, Article 7(3)
of the ICTY preserves-at least facially-a "negligence" mens rea
standard.8 Although the jurisprudence of the Tribunal once again

55. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 128 (noting that the standard
could be interpreted in a manner that would create strict liability).
56. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, General
Information, (stating that the Tribunal has the authority to prosecute breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws of war, genocide, and crimes
against humanity), at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/factsheets/generlinfo-e.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
57. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), available at http://www.un.org/ictylbasic/statut/statll-2004.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2004).
58. See, e.g., KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
254 (2001) (stating that the negligence standard for command responsibility is
equal to at least acquiescence and possibly malicious intent). Most commentators
and courts assert that this standard is not a form of strict liability. Id. But see
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 128 (noting that, in practice, the difference
between negligence and strict liability narrows when an investigator contends that
a commander has the means to learn of abuses by subordinates based on a small
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demonstrates an institutional concern for allowing simple negligence
to suffice for criminal liability, ICTY cases have adopted a fairly low
mens rea requirement.5 9

In Prosecutor v. Delalic, the Trial Chamber indicated that the
drafters of Article 86 did not intend negligence to be a purely objective
standard. 6° The court examined the legislative history of the statute
and found that the drafters rejected such a standard when they refused
to adopt language assigning liability if the commander "knew or
should have known" of the actions of the commander's subordinates. 61
Instead, the Trial Chamber found that the prosecution must show that
the individual actually possessed specific information that would put
the individual on notice of the crimes of his or her subordinates. 62
The precise contours of this "information" requirement are not
clear, however; it appears to create a mens rea standard that resides
somewhere between simple negligence and recklessness. 63 The
Tribunal cases reveal that a principal objective underlying the mens
rea requirement of ICTY Article 7(3) is to prevent a superior from
remaining willfully blind to the acts of his subordinates. 64 The Trial
amount of information).
59. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (examining the Tribunal's
efforts to explain the negligence standard).
60. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT- 96-21-T, 392 (I.C.T.Y. Nov. 16,
1998) (noting that the English version of the statutory provision differs from the
French version in that the English version contains both an objective and
subjective element while the French version contains only an objective element).
The delegates decided that these differences were not substantive. Id.
61. See id.
391 (discussing the drafters' rejection of the International
Committee of the Red Cross' proposal and the amended version offered by the
United States, both of which included language requiring that an officer knew or
should have known of the actions of his or her subordinates in order to be
criminally liable for the actions of those subordinates); see also M. CHERIF
BASsIOuNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 485 n.16 (1998) (noting that "had reason to know" and
"should have known" are not always distinguished).
62. See Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 393 (commenting that the information
by itself need not prove that the crimes took place).
63. Compare id. (explaining that "information" is such that a responsible
superior would look into the matter further), with infra notes 163-165 and
accompanying text (defining "recklessness" and "negligence").
64. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (reviewing how the Tribunal
has addressed the knowledge element).
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Chamber in Delalic stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that a superior
who simply ignores information within his actual possession
compelling the conclusion that criminal offences [sic] are being
committed, or are about to be committed, by his subordinates commits
a most serious dereliction of duty..." 65 However, the Tribunal
advocated a standard that is more burdensome on the superior than a
recklessness or willful blindness mens rea that would be adequate to
meet this objective. Instead of requiring a showing of gross negligence
or negligence that is tantamount to malicious intent, the Trial Chamber
in Delalic stated that the mens rea requirement is met if the accused
possesses information that:
need not be such that it by itself was sufficient to compel the conclusion
of the existence of such crimes. It is sufficient that the superior was put on
further inquiry by the information, or, in other words, that it indicated the
need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences
66
were being committed or about to be committed by his subordinates.

More recently, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutorv. Blaskic retreated
from the already low information standard in Delalic.6 7 It prescribed a
negligence-type mens rea, stating that, "ignorance cannot be a defence
[sic] where the absence of knowledge is the result of negligence in the
discharge" of an officer's duties. 68 A court need only assess the
"particular position of command and the circumstances prevailing at
the time ' 69 to determine if the commander had reason to know.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

As in Yugoslavia, the massive human rights atrocities and genocide
committed in Rwanda prompted the creation of a statute that permitted
65. See Delalic, Case No. IT 96-21-T, 387 (proclaiming that an officer will
be held criminally liable for ignoring this sort of information).
66. See id. 393 (confirming that this is the standard for the mens rea required
by Article 7(3)).
67. See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 332 (declaring that an officer will not
be liable for the illegal actions of his subordinates where the officer exercised due
diligence but remained unaware).
68. See id. (concluding that ignorance is not a defense where an officer had
reason to know of illegal actions being committed by his subordinates).
69. See id.
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the prosecution of leaders as well as subordinates.7" Article 6(3) of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR")
states that a superior is liable for a subordinate's criminal acts if the
superior knew or should have known that the subordinate would
commit such acts, or if the superior failed to prevent or punish such
acts.7 Although virtually identical to the statute of the ICTY, the ICTR
has treated the mens rea requirement of command responsibility in
somewhat different and varied ways.72
Analyzing the mens rea requirement in Prosecutorv. Musema, the
Trial Chamber examined the legislative history of the Additional
Protocol and adopted a comparatively high mens rea requirement. 73 It
found that:
the requisite mens rea of any crime is the accused's criminal intent. This
requirement, which amounts to at least a negligence that is so serious as to
be tantamount to acquiescence, also applies in determining the individual
criminal responsibility of a person accused of crimes defined in the
Statute, for which it is certainly proper to ensure that there existed
malicious intent, or, at least, to ensure that the accused's negligence was
so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence or even malicious intent.74

In marked contrast to the position held in Musema, the Trial
Chamber in the more recent case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
advocated a reduced, negligence-type mens rea requirement. 75 It
70. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General Information
(stating that the Tribunal prosecutes those who have committed genocide or who
have violated international humanitarian law in the territory of Rwanda in 1994),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2004).
71. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(3), 33
I.L.M. 1602, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc. S/RES/1512 (2003), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
72. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (outlining two different
negligence standards the Court employed in two separate cases).
73. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the requirement of an
elevated standard of negligence to meet the mens rea).
74. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. IT-96-13-A, 131 (I.C.T.R. Jan. 27,
2000), available at 2000 WL 33348765.
75. See infra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the Trial Chamber's
position as to when an officer will have the requisite mens rea to be held
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found, pursuant to Article 6(3) of the ITCR, that a superior possesses
the requisite mens rea where:
[h]e or she had information which put him or her on notice of the risk of
such offences by indicating the need for additional investigation in order
to ascertain whether such offences were about to be committed, were
being committed, or had been committed, by subordinates; or,
the absence of knowledge is the result of negligence in the discharge of
the superior's duties; that is, where the superior failed to exercise the
means available to him or her to learn of76the offences, and under the
circumstances he or she should have known.

E. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") is the
first international instrument that comprehensively established a
general code of international criminal law. 7 Article 28 of the ICC
statute codifies the command responsibility doctrine. In addition to
other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may
be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes; and

criminally liable).
76. See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. IT-95-lA-T, 46 (I.C.T.R. June
7, 2001), available at 2001 WL 677343.
77. See THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 20 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter ICC:
ELEMENTS AND RULES] (noting the Rome Statute's inclusion of a variety of penal
principles, including legality, individual criminal responsibility, the responsibility
of accomplices, genocide, and command responsibility).

86
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(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
78
prosecution.

Article 28 is the first international statute that distinguishes between
civilian and military superiors, assigning different standards of
culpability based on this classification.7 9 It is not entirely clear what
practical, political, or philosophical reasons prompted this division.80

78. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 28,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc (last visited Oct. 19, 2004)
79. See ICC: ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 77, at 21 (discussing the
deviation from the standard mens rea used elsewhere in the Rome Statute).
80. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. IT-95-1,-T, 216 (I.C.T.R.
May 21, 1999) (indicating that some drafters may have desired a higher mens rea
because of the perception that civilians are perceived as having less control and
consequently, less of a duty than military commanders). Specifically, the court
stated that, "the crucial question in those cases was not the civilian status of the
accused, but of the degree of authority he exercised over his subordinates." Id. See
also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-96-4-T, 490 (I.C.T.R. Sept. 2, 1998)
(noting that Judge R611ing's strong dissent in the Tokyo trials expressed concern
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However, it is clear that this aspect was a source of considerable
debate during negotiations."1 Irrespective of motivations, the explicit
recognition of both a reckless-type "conscious disregard" standard and
a negligence standard requires an interpretation such that the
International Criminal Court hold military commanders to some form
of negligence standard.82
F. THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINAL ELEMENTS OF COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY

Prior to the creation of the ICC, the relative statutory ambiguity in
the Additional Protocol and Tribunal statutes permitted interpretive
flexibility and minimum mens rea standards that resided somewhere
between negligence and recklessness. 3 However, the codification of

distinct negligence and recklessness-type standards in the ICC statute
makes such flexibility improbable in the immediate future.84 The ICC
statute will influence the customary development of the command
responsibility doctrine because international courts considered it
compelling evidence of the practice and policies of states; therefore,
the likely result will be that international courts recognize negligence
as the minimum mens rea for military commanders and recklessness
as the minimum mens rea for civilian superiors.

with holding civilian officials responsible for the behavior of the army in the field
and that considerations of justice and expediency indicate that responsibility for
civilian superiors should be restricted).
81. See ICC: ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 77, at 21 (reporting on the
considerable debate about the "subjective part of a crime" and the effect on the
newly drawn distinction between civilian and military superiors).
82. But see Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors
in the InternationalCriminal Court, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89, 122 (2000) (arguing
that the ICC statute does not give a simple negligence standard). Vetter further
argues that the clause "owing to the circumstances at the time" makes the mens rea
distinguishable from a "mythical should have known" standard. Id.
83. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (relating the ease in which
interpretation can lower the relevant level of mens rea).
84. Cf id. (emphasizing the previous flexibility that courts had at
interpretation).
85. See, e.g., Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 322 (prescribing a negligence
standard for military commanders after completion of the ICC statute).
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II. A NORMATIVE CRITIQUE
The preceding historical account reveals that the command
responsibility doctrine, in its various customary and statutory
manifestations, creates liability based on a combination of omission
and a minimum mens rea that resides somewhere between
negligence and recklessness. The next part of this Article will assess
the justness of such a combination.86
A. A PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMiNAL LAW
The philosophy underlying criminal law establishes the parameters
that should constrain lawmakers in the creation and punishment of
crimes.8 Therefore, any critique of the "justness" of a particular
criminal law doctrine must proceed from a philosophical starting
point.88
A community, whether it is local, national, or international,
develops norms that reflect some conception of good. Society
criminalizes behavior in order to announce these norms, to punish
conduct that it deems reprehensible, and to discourage socially
unacceptable behavior. 89 Thus, criminal law serves many goals,
including the deterrence and punishment of crimes, incapacitation,
denunciation of wrongfulness, and rehabilitation.90
Lawmakers should distinguish the myriad aspirational goals of
criminal law from the goals and limitations required by a particular

86. See Damaska, supra note 7, at 456 (noting that as international criminal
justice institutions come into being, the pairing of these issues should be
discussed).
87. See DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 224 (1987)
(underscoring the importance of determining the "limits of the criminal sanction as
an integral part of criminal theory").
88. See id. (advocating the need to start with the philosophy behind the creation
of the laws to determine whether the doctrine is working).
89. See APPLEMAN, supra note 37, at 9 (explaining that the purpose of criminal
law is to punish the wrongdoer for his offense against the mores of society and to
deter others from acting likewise).
90. See C.T.

SISTARE, RESPONSIBILITY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY

11-12 (1989)

(discussing the law's twin aims of ensuring public safety and individual justice).
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philosophy or theory of criminal law. 91 For example, a utilitarianbased, deterrence theory of criminal law allows society to use an
92
individual to promote and ensure conformity to its standards.
Conversely, a deontological, retributive theory of criminal law
generally requires that society ground liability in individual guilt, and
not use the individual solely for the pursuit of societal ends.93 It is
possible to conceive of law as proceeding from a singular philosophy
with certain mandates, but having consequences that are the
aspirational objectives of many different philosophies. These
consequences, however, are merely coincidental and may not override
the mandates of the theory that guides the creation of legal norms.
This Article presumes the correctness of a deontological, retributive
theory of criminal law. 94Under this theory, lawmakers should
criminalize and punish only wrongful and blameworthy conduct. 95
There must be some moral justification for imposing suffering upon
another person. This theory implicitly recognizes the value of the
human person as the "subject, end, and intellectual point of reference
in the idea of law, '96 which considers the individual a moral actor
91. See HUSAK, supra note 87, at 227 (showing the potential contradictions in
criminal theory which result depending on the moral philosophy used for analysis).
92. See Joanna Waley-Cohen, Collective Responsibility in Qing Criminal Law,
in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 112 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds.,
2000) (describing the historical approach of the Chinese and the application of
collective responsibility to "create a self policing network" to reinforce the power
of the state).
93. See also Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, in INDIVIDUAL AND
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 51 (Peter French ed., 2d ed. 1998) (1972) (explaining
that all primitive legal systems recognized the notion of collective responsibility
whereby moral fault is transferred across a group and is not necessarily restricted
to the individual).
94. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 28 (1997) (basing the same assumption on the notion that
punishing an individual beyond what he deserves does not achieve retributive
justice and that the structure of Anglo-American law does not effectively deter
future criminal behavior).
95. See HUSAK, supra note 87, at 225 (explaining that "the retributive
tradition ...restricts punishment to the deserving") (emphasis in original).
96. Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1, 20 (1990). See generally Janet E. Smith, Natural Law and Personalism in
Veritatis Splendor, in JOHN PAUL II AND MORAL THEOLOGY: READINGS IN MORAL
THEOLOGY No. 10 67 (Charles E. Curran & Richard A McCormick, S.J. eds.,
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whose will and choices help define the blameworthiness of actions and
justify his punishment.97
Although criminal punishment may have the added benefit of
deterring future conduct, deterrence and other utilitarian objectives of
punishment are coincidental and should not override the moral
justifications for law and punishment.98 Justice requires a respect for
moral rights, and, therefore, that lawmakers root criminal law in moral
justifications; however, they "need not purge utilitarian thinking from
the law altogether."99 Deterring crime and protecting society should be
a concern of criminal justice; however, such utilitarian benefits should
not be justified by violating fundamental principles of criminal
liability.100
B. A NORMATIVE CRITIQUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY

The scope of the command responsibility doctrine is one of the
most important issues in international criminal law.' 0 Interpreted
liberally, the doctrine can have a powerful deterrent effect, giving
superiors and commanders the incentive to prevent and punish
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 10 2 It can also help
improve the chances of prosecuting superiors and commanders who

1998) (comparing natural law and personalism).
97. Cf WALTER G. JEFFKO, CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL ISSUES: A PERSONAL
PERSPECTIVE 18 (1999) (recognizing the moral importance of will and intention,

but disagreeing that the law should reduce the total morality of an action to its
intention). Rather, "both motive and consequences have moral significance as
elements of action." Id.
98. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 89 (noting that retributivists believe that the
deterrence of future criminal acts is not a justification for punishment).
99. HUSAK, supra note 87, at 51 (suggesting that by punishing culpable
persons, gains in utility may offer a necessary condition for criminalization).
100. See id. at 52 (indicating that such requirements of justice should establish
the boundaries in which reform must take place).
101. See RATNER & ABRAMS,supra note 16, at 128. (showing uncertainty of the
scope of individual responsibility for potential aggressors, and weighing the import
of the Nuremberg Principles).
102. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (maintaining that finding
Yamashita criminally liable helped to deter future criminal behavior which would
have violated the laws of war).
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are complicit in criminal activity, but due to their elevated positions,
are able to avoid liability for individual criminal acts. 103 While the
doctrine has proven effective as a prosecutorial tool and may deter
crime, an analysis of the jurisprudence defining and applying the
elements of the doctrine reveals that the law has not consistently
developed in a manner that respects a deontological retributive
1 04
theory.
The scope of the doctrine depends upon the elements of the crime
and requires that a superior-subordinate relationship exists; that the
superior knew, or should have known, or deliberately ignored
information that would lead him to believe that a subordinate would
commit or had committed a crime; and that the superior failed to take
measures to prevent the crime or punish the person behind the criminal
05
act.1
As discussed, the statutes and cases combine a minimum mens rea
of negligence (arguably recklessness depending upon the court and
statute) with an actus reus of omission.10 6 Although independentlyvalid bases for criminal liability, the convergence of omission and
negligence is problematic because the retributive theory normally
requires a respect for moral principles and a justification for
punishment grounded in the blameworthiness of the individual. 107 The
command responsibility doctrine's combination of elements does not
ground liability in individual fault. 0 Rather, the combination assigns
liability based on whether the person had the power to prevent the
103. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the Yamashita court's
extension of liability to a commander without direct evidence linking him to the
crimes committed by his subordinates).
104. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text (discussing the additional
importance that the International Criminal Court places on deterring future
conduct).
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 78, art. 28 (detailing the responsibilities of
commanders and other superiors).
106. See infra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the confluence of omission and negligence
in command responsibility).
107. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 79 (demanding that those subject to
punishment have done something both morally and culpably wrong and stressing
the importance of "wrongful action") (emphasis added).
108. See Rome Statute, supra note 78, art. 28 (basing liability for a military
commander on the extent of their knowledge of the relevant crime).
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crime. 109 This formulation values deterrence of crime over the
importance of the person, using the person as a means to an end. Such
a use is anathema to the retributive theory. "0 In those instances in
which international courts will interpret the doctrine to require a
mental element that is more than negligence, the command
responsibility doctrine is more consistent with a retributive theory of
law.
1. Negligence: A Weak Basisfor Liability Under the Retributive

Theory
Criminal liability generally requires a guilty mind, or mens rea,
causally linked to some form of affirmative, voluntary conduct. "' The
law recognizes various degrees of mens rea, including intent,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, with differing levels of
agreement regarding their appropriateness as a basis for criminal
liability." 2
The mens rea of intent is paradigmatic of the guilty mind.' Intent
14
is the best indication of a conscious choice to commit a crime.
Intent, coupled with affirmative action, is evidence of the highest
degree of imputative responsibility.' ' Knowledge rivals intent as an
archetype of the guilty mind. "6 Aside from theoretically-reasoned
109. See id. (criminalizing behavior in which the superior "failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress"
the commission of the crimes).
110. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 88-89 (explaining that the only goal of the
retributive theory is to punish the offender because he did the offense and that
punishing someone for any other reason does not achieve retributive justice).
111. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01 (3d ed.
2001) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)) (noting that the
existence of mens rea is "rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence").
112. See generally id. §§ 10.03-10.04 (defining various forms of mens rea and
analyzing their appropriateness from utilitarian and retributive perspectives).
113. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 93 (discussing the role of intentionality in
establishing mens rea).
114. See id. (examining the implications of intention).
115. See id. (defining intent as, among other things, "to design, resolve, propose,
or plan for").
116. See id. at 119 (differentiating between intent and knowledge).
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justifications, it seems intuitively correct to hold criminally liable a
person who acts with knowledge of the consequences of his
conduct.117 Recklessness is also a well-accepted theory of criminal
culpability. An actor is reckless if he consciously disregards a
substantial risk.11 Disregarding a risk is, in essence, a conscious
departure from an acceptable level of "legally permissible risktaking."119
Negligence is a highly-debated, but well-established basis for
imposing criminal liability.2 0 It is a concept infused with overtones of
a utilitarian-based deterrence philosophy of criminal law.121 A law that
contains a negligence standard ascribes liability if a reasonable person
should have known that his conduct would have certain
consequences. 112 Assigning liability for negligence may increase
deterrence by forcing people to act with greater consideration for the
123
consequences of their actions.

117. See id. (asserting that knowledge has long been recognized as an element of
responsibility).
118. See id. at 93 (defining "recklessness" as a situation where the actor was
most likely aware of particular circumstances or of the probability that specific
consequences would result).
119. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 262 (1978) (noting the
difference between disregarding a risk and failing to perceive a risk, the latter
resulting from a failure to adhere to reasonable standards of attentiveness).
120. See DRESSLER, supra note 111, § 10.04(D)(2)(c) (explaining the
controversy over holding someone accountable for negligence when they do not
actually have a mens rea, or "guilty mind"). Utilitarians debate punishing negligent
actors because such punishment will not serve the purpose of deterrence if the
actor was unaware to begin with. Id. Retributivists also debate whether punishment
for negligence is appropriate or whether an actor must have done "voluntary
wrongdoing." Id.
121. See HUSAK, supra note 87, at 132 (identifying deterrence as a source of
debate among theorists when considering the effectiveness of attaching criminal
liability to negligence and questioning the wisdom of accepting negligence as a
form of mens rea).
122. See DRESSLER, supra note 111, § 10.04(D)(2)(a) (defining negligence as
"the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the actor's
situation").
123. But see id. § 10.04(D)(2)(d) (noting that theorists disagree over whether
criminal liability inspires would-be offenders to consider their actions more
carefully but suggesting that the argument is actually irrelevant as it pertains to the
fairness of ascribing criminal liability to negligent actors because the primary
question is whether or not negligent persons "deserve" to be held criminally
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The debate over negligence as a just basis for imposing criminal
liability is best examined in two analytical stages. The first stage
assesses whether persons who act negligently ever deserve criminal
liability. 124 The second stage accepts that negligence can be a valid
basis for criminal liability, but evaluates the conditions under which
based
individuals may properly be held liable for the acts of another
25
1
standard.
individualized,
on this objective, rather than on an
An affirmative choice to do wrong essentially defines culpability.'26
Accordingly, negligence may be considered, primafacie, an improper
basis for liability because it does not create a sufficient link between
the criminal liability imposed and an individualized awareness of
responsibility. Culpability arises from a failure to perceive a risk rather
than a deliberate choice to disregard a risk or commit a wrongful
act. 127
Although not reflecting a guilty mind that is rooted in some
conscious choice, it nevertheless makes some sense to morally
condemn a failure to carefully consider a particular situation and to
disregard cognizable risks. 128 However, this kind of culpability is
distinguishable from other forms of culpable choice, and should be

liable).
124. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.4 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE] (representing a
deontological retributive approach).
125. See Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, CriminalLiabilityfor the
Actions of Subordinates - The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its
Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 272, 278 (1997) (declaring
that two problems must be addressed when holding subordinates accountable,
including whether a superior shares the same mens rea of his subordinate and
when it is fair to hold a superior liable for a subordinate's actions).
126. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 412 (distinguishing between a person who
acts unreasonably but is unaware of the associated risk and a person who
undertakes an unreasonable risk understanding the implications of the action).
127. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 138 (noting that one objection to a
negligence mens rea is that it holds people accountable when they did not choose
to commit crimes).
128. See id. at 139 (stating that the failure to consider circumstances and to take
sensible precautions are kinds of choices concerning "the reasonable exercise of
capacities in conduct" and are "ordinary grounds for moral censure," but are not
choices of intended action).
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viewed as a lesser form of culpability, even if not completely
129
inconsistent with a morally-rooted theory of law.
Despite

theoretical

arguments

that

question the

validity of

negligence as a state of mind sufficient for imposing criminal liability,
it does exist and is actually quite common. 3 0 Even accepting that

negligence can be a legitimate basis for imposing liability, the
circumstances and conditions under which negligence liability
generally operates is necessarily bounded by the "low level of
responsibility involved." '' For example, many negligence-based

criminal laws only permit a finding of liability for negligence that is
considered a gross deviation from the standard of conduct.

132

In addition, punishment for crimes with a negligence mens rea is

also generally more lenient, possibly reflecting an inherent uneasiness
with apportioning punishment equal to those crimes with a higher
mens rea and a stronger indication of individualized guilt.'33 Finally,
most criminal laws require some affirmative conduct that strongly
reflects a deliberate choice to act negligently.'34
2. Actus Reus: Omissions under CriminalLaw Theory
Despite the focus on a guilty mind, criminal law does not impose

liability

for thoughts

alone.

135

Rather, there

must be

some

129. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 414 (arguing that culpability based on
negligence represents liability arising from lack of judgment as opposed to choice).
130. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 124, at 83 (noting the trend to require
"something more" than ordinary negligence to establish criminal liability).
131. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 141 (asserting that gross negligence is a
preferable standard for criminal liability).
132. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 124, § 210.4 (explaining the
reasoning underlying the Code's insistence on gross negligence instead of
inadvertent negligence for criminal liability).
133. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 2A1.4 (increasing the base
offense level, and thus the sentence length, for criminally negligent homicide from
level 10 to level 12, and increasing the base offense level for reckless involuntary
manslaughter offenses from level 14 to level 18).
134. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 45 (introducing the concept of the act
doctrine as a basic principle of liability).
135. See HUSAK, supra note 87, at 93 (noting that no Anglo-American
jurisdiction has likely ever punished someone for thoughts that did not result in
action).
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manifestation of that guilty mental state in the form of conduct. 13 6 This
conduct is an elemental requirement of criminal law known as the
actus reus. 137
While the actus reus element can be understood as a requirement of
affirmative, physical action, it can also be viewed less formalistically,
in a manner that examines the purpose of the element. 138 From this
defeasible principle even if they
perspective, omissions can meet the
39
are not the paradigm of actus reus.1
Although generally accepted as a legitimate form of actus reus,
criminal liability for an omission is less common than criminal
liability for affirmative conduct.140 There are a number of reasonable
explanations for this. 14' Omissions are often harder to identify than
commissions, which may make legislators reluctant to create crimes
that are difficult to prove. 42 Additionally, there may be a general
reluctance to ascribe a duty to act due to the tradition of liberalism in

136. See DRESSLER, supra note 11, § 9.02(A) (explaining that a voluntary act is
generally considered an implicit element of a crime).
137. See id. § 9.01(A) (defining actus reus as a voluntary act that causes social
harm).
138. See id. (defining and explaining the act doctrine as "a defeasible (negative)
principle," the function of which is to "preclude from criminal liability and
legislation ...status offenses, liability based on condition or propensity, and
'punishment for mere thoughts"').
139. See id. at 56 (noting that omissions should be distinguished from simple
non-events). An omission that can form the basis for liability must be the
correlative of an act that a person was under a duty to perform. Id. For criminal
omissions, the framework of expectations derives from created or legally
recognized obligations. It is the framework of expectations, in part, which enables
us to identify omissions as distinguished from non-events. The expectations help
us to specify the circumstances constituting a failure of performance. Id. See
generally HUSAK, supra note 87, at 83-97 (identifying omissions as the most
difficult upon which to impose liability).
140. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 57 (explaining that Anglo-American law
does not generally recognize a legal duty to act).
141. See infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text (examining two reasons
why omissions are less often relied upon as a basis of culpability).
142. But see SISTARE, supra note 90, at 58 (contending that the difficulty in
identifying omissions versus commissions should not determine whether or not
they may form the basis for criminal liability).
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criminal law which places a societal emphasis on personal freedom
14
and minimizes the imposition of obligations on individuals. 1
From a philosophical perspective, omissions-as a form of culpable
conduct-do not implicitly offend either a utilitarian-based deterrence
theory or a deontological retributive theory. Imposing liability for a
failure to act can create the same incentives and deterrent effect as for
affirmative action. '"Moreover, the moral approbation that is
associated with affirmative action would seem to attach as readily,
although perhaps not to the same extent, 145 to a failure to act, provided
there was a guilty mind. 146
Although there may be no self-evident, cogent rationale for
preferring commissions to omissions as a condition of criminal
liability, a general discomfort with omissions seems intuitively
correct. 147 In some sense, this intuitive appeal seems linked to
society's culpability judgments regarding what kind of conduct should
be considered wrongful. 148 Intuition regarding the level of culpability,
however, does not necessarily imply that omissions are not a valid
form of culpable conduct, only that we prefer commissions.' 49

143. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 278 (theorizing that a criminally enforceable
duty impedes on individual liberty more than a law that prohibits specific acts).
144. See DRESSLER, supra note 111, § 9.06(B) (noting that, for example,
punishing people for their omissions might breed social cohesion and deter those
who would otherwise do wrong from acting for fear of likely intervention).
145. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 278-79 (arguing that some failures to act are
wrongful, but they are less deserving of punishment than an affirmative wrongful
act).
146. But see DRESSLER, supra note 111, § 9.06(C) (claiming that it may be more
difficult to infer mens rea from an omission because non-acts may be
"ambiguous").
147. See e.g., George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily

Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1443, 1448-49 (1994) (expressing concern that
punishment for omissions violates the principle that one should not be punished for
something that is not prohibited by law). Fletcher is particularly troubled by the
cases where one allows another to die by not helping them, and then the act is
therefore labeled as murder. Id.
148. See id. at 1149 (determining that the literature discussing omissions is
mainly focused on "condemning the injustice of not punishing immoral
omissions").
149. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 60 (maintaining that criminal liability does
not turn on the degree of wrongfulness but rather on the level of the actor's
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If not per se an improper basis for liability, it seems reasonable and
fair to create a duty and assign a positive obligation under the criminal
law doctrine of command responsibility. Military and civilian leaders
who accept the responsibilities and authority of their positions must
also be aware of and accept the attendant obligations. 50 Assessing the
justness of the command responsibility doctrine ultimately requires
consideration of the omission element in conjunction with the mental
element.151
3. The Confluence of Omission and Negligence in Command
Responsibility: A Problematic Theory of CriminalLiability
Although omissions or negligence are not independently
objectionable, the combination in a criminal doctrine is
troublesome. 5 2 This Article contends that individuals have a more
tenuous link to their omissions, generally having far less control and
exercising less independent choice, than to their commissions. 53 In the
command responsibility context, the violator may combine the actus
reus of omission with a minimum mens rea of negligence, which also
lacks a strong volitional element.154 This combination is problematic
because it assigns liability to a superior without a strong element of
fault and without a strong element of independent choice manifested
through some action.155
culpability).
150. See Wu & Kang, supra note 125, at 290 (arguing that the burden of
accountability must fall on those individuals who wield the power to prevent
crimes from being committed).
151. See id. at 291 (noting that it would be unfair to punish superiors for acts
over which they did not have control).
152. See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text (concluding that basing
liability on a combination of negligence and an omission means punishing
someone who has no individualized fault).
153. See SISTARE, stipra note 90, at 58-59 (relating society's general aversions
to criminalizing omissions based upon a difficulty in conceptualizing fault in
"failing to avert a result").
154. See Wu & Kang, supra note 125, at 278 (reviewing the command
responsibility doctrine's basic principles of a superior's omission in controlling a
subordinate and a minimum of negligence in the superior's knowledge that the
subordinate was about to commit an illegal act).
155. See id. at 283 (observing that a lowered mens rea requirement makes the
"scope of criminal law less predictable" and results in a "'chilling effect' on
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Negligence bases liability not on the subjective state of mind of the
56
violator, but on an objective standard that the violator fails to meet.
Negligence assigns liability in rare circumstances in which the absence
of individualized responsibility seems acceptable and under
circumstances and conditions that justify its imposition.' 57 One such
circumstance should be an overt, volitional act that is not met by an
actus reus of omission. 158 Without such an act, the command
responsibility doctrine requires almost no evidence of individualized
responsibility and, therefore, is incompatible with a theory of criminal
justice that values the individual as the necessary unit of moral
accountability.' 59
4. The Confluence of Omission and Recklessness (Willful
Ignorance):A More Justifiable Theory of Liability
Although omissions can be a valid form of conduct, the minimum
required mens rea should be higher than negligence. 60 The issue thus
becomes the appropriate mental state on which liability based on an
omission may be justified.' 6 ' This Article asserts that there must be
some individualization of fault before criminal liability is ever
blameless and desirable conduct").
156. See id. at 284-85 (interpreting the objective standard of negligence in the
command responsibility doctrine as a superior being held responsible for "the
knowledge that a reasonable agent in his position would have possessed,"
regardless of the "conscious apprehension(s)" of the superior).
157. See Damaska, supra note 7, at 455 (explaining that lawmakers created the
command responsibility doctrine's liability under the recognition that superiors
develop plans and issue orders for their subordinates to execute resulting in a crime
and affording superiors more "opportunity for deliberation and reflection than their
subordinates").
158. See id. (drawing a distinction between the omission to prevent and the
omission to punish and distinguishing the culpability involved).
159. But see FLETCHER, supra note 119, at 626-27 (examining negligent
omissions and stating that "there is nothing linguistically amiss in 'intentionally' or
'negligently' breaching a duty where the duty consists of acting a particular way,
rather than in averting an impending harm").
160. See Wu & Kang, supra note 125, at 283 (noting practical deterrence-based
reasons for requiring an elevated mens rea requirement).
161. See SISTARE, supra note 90, at 60 (arguing that the law cannot determine
the comparative weight of moral duties to act, but instead it can only measure the
mens rea behind the act or omission).
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appropriate, and that this individualization must exist in the confluence
of conduct and mental state.
Recklessness or willful ignorance may satisfy this requirement of a
mental state that has some individualized awareness of fault.1 62 A
person acts recklessly "when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk" under a specific set of circumstances. 63 Unlike
mere negligence, recklessness requires a subjective analysis of a
person's mental state under this specific set of circumstances. 11
Moreover, recklessness involves a culpable, affirmative choice to
disregard a substantial risk. 65 Negligence only requires a failure to
perceive a risk. 166 Willful ignorance is a species of recklessness or
knowledge where an individual intentionally or consciously avoids
knowing something incriminatory. 67 While the point is arguable in the
command responsibility context, recklessness and willful ignorance
are more justifiable under a deontological retributive theory because
these mental states contain some element of conscious wrongdoing
6
under particularized circumstances.1 1

162. See infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text (comparing the definitions
of "recklessness," "willful ignorance," and "negligence" and contrasting the mens
rea analysis required for each).
163. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining "recklessly" and elaborating that
disregarding a risk "involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation").
164. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142-43 (5th ed. 1979) (referring to
the mens rea analysis for recklessness as "[t]he state of mind accompanying an act,
which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious consequences"),
with id. at 930-31 (giving the required mens rea analysis for "negligence" as "[t]he
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary
considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do").
165. See id. at 1142-43 (elaborating that "recklessness" involves a "state of mind
"which, though foreseeing such consequences persists in spite of such
knowledge").
166. See id. at 930-31 (relaying that "negligence" involves "a failure to do what
a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances").
167. See id. at 1434 (describing "willful" as denoting "an act which is
intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental").
168. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 79 (claiming that active responsibility
encompasses the properties of wrongdoing and culpability, which in turn consist of
voluntariness, causation, intentionality, and lack of excuse).
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In sum, a respect for human dignity under the law requires a certain
level of individualized fault before criminalization and punishment are
appropriate. 169 In those instances in which superiors are held liable for
negligently failing to prevent or punish crimes of subordinates, the
doctrine of command responsibility offends this basic tenet.
Alternatively, in those instances where the doctrine requires a mens
rea that is more than negligence, it is more justifiable. 170

III. AN EXPLANATORY ACCOUNT
The most recent declaration of the command responsibility doctrine
in the ICC statute indicates that a negligence standard will likely
persist under international law. 71 Such a standard, in combination with
an actus reus of omission, is offensive to a deontological retributive
theory of criminal law that values individual responsibility. 72 At least
three explanations exist for this condition.
First, the recognition of a negligence standard may be attributable to
the fact that in the international context, the retributive theory is not
the dominant normative philosophy of law. In addition, major
international instruments, while listing multiple objectives for

169. See id. (arguing that punishing those who deserve punishment is what
"gives the essence, and defines the borders, of criminal law").
170. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text (proposing recklessness
and willful ignorance as proper substitutes for negligence in the command
responsibility context); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 13,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (citing the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda which mandates that in imposing penalties, the ICTR must
take into account the "individual circumstances of the convicted person").
Although international tribunals must account for individual circumstances in their
sentencing guidelines, there is no requirement that they limit the penalty based on
987-88
the state of mind. See also Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. IT-96-13
(stating the general principles of the ICTR regarding the determination of
sentences). For example, in Musema, the Tribunal balanced mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, but felt that "deterrence, to dissuade for ever others
who may be tempted to commit atrocities" was the preeminent concern. Id. 986.
171. See Rome Statute, supra note 78, art. 28 (citing the sections of the Rome
Statute that indicate that a commander or a superior will be liable in situations
where they "should have known" that their subordinates were committing crimes).
172. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 28 (arguing that the retributive theory of
criminal law requires punishment only when the offender is directly and
consciously at fault).
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international law, generally fail to adopt a normative theory to guide
the creation of laws when different objectives come into conflict. For
example, in establishing the ICTY, Security Council Resolution 827
states that the purpose of the Tribunal is to "put an end to
[international crimes] and to take effective measures to bring to justice
' This statement indicates
the persons who are responsible for them."173
that the United Nations is focused on the objectives of deterrence and
just punishment; however, it does not state that one objective is
absolute. 174 Similarly, the ICC's website describes individual criminal
accountability as "a cornerstone of international criminal law," and
effective deterrence "a primary objective of those working to establish
a criminal court," without any indication of which objective is
75
paramount. 1
If retribution is not the dominant theory, it must share
developmental influence with other theories, and, therefore, cannot
76
independently shape the creation of international legal principles.
Without a dominant theory, the creation of international law involves a
dynamic of compromise that advances the values and needs of the
international community in a pragmatic way. 77 The creation of both
customary and treaty law processes balance and trade normative
theories, political principles, and practical objectives in a manner that
maximizes the collective good under prevailing circumstances. This

173. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993) (outlining the U.N.'s basis for establishing the ICTY), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-827_93.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2004).
174. See generally id. (failing to declare which objective of the ICTY,

deterrence or punishment, takes precedence in prosecuting war crimes).
175. See Rome Statute, supra note 78, overview (providing the United Nations'
reasons for why the world needs an International Criminal Court).
176. See, e.g., LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 325
(1997) (rejecting a retribution theory and stating that "international criminal law
must serve broader purposes for the community at large, on a constructive and
prospective basis, whether built on the foundations of utilitarianism, or a 'social
engineering approach"').
177. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability
of ProsecutorialDiscretion at the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.

510, 543 (2003) (explaining prosecutorial discretion and noting that the tribunals
combine a retributive and deterrent methodology).

20041

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

dynamic was evident in the ICC negotiations on the Elements of
Crimes. 178 As one commentator noted:
[S]ome delegates approached the Elements from the perspective of
ensuring broad principles that would facilitate prosecution. Other
delegates tended to approach the Elements from the perspective of the
accused or safeguarding sovereignty. Both approaches were ultimately
useful, as the resulting debate and dialogue
were necessary in order to
179
strike the right balance in the Elements.

While such a balancing approach may be necessary, it can result in
legal doctrines that compromise principles for practical results. This

compromise may be permissible under a utilitarian approach that
seeks to maximize the net social good. 180 However, it is not
satisfactory under a principled theory, such as retributivism, which
holds that the situation only warrants punishment if offenders deserve
to be punished.'81
A second explanation for the failure to observe the principle of
individual fault is that the international community, while generally
focused on moral principles and retributive theory, recognizes the

justness

of collective

responsibility

in some circumstances. 182

178. See ICC: ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 77, at 219 (referring to the
events surrounding the negotiations of the Rome Statute in which the majority
acceded to the minority on the issue of developing Elements of Crimes as "part of
an overall effort to reach general agreement and to make every effort to
accommodate any legitimate concerns of hesitant delegations" in order to finalize
the Rome Statute).
179. Id. at 221 (asserting that the disagreements between the parties to the Rome
Statute created a negotiated instrument of international law that was satisfactory to
both sides, thus "bolster[ing] the credibility of the Court as a truly international
court").
180. See HUSAK, supra note 87, at 132 (indicating that some theorists believe a
negligence standard creates a greater good by deterring crimes that negatively
affect society as a whole, in exchange for punishing one individual who may not
have a high degree of personal fault).
181. See MOORE, supra note 94, at 28 (maintaining that the retributive theory
and its requirement of individual culpability cannot co-exist with deterrence as an
effective goal of international law).
182. See infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text (contending that normally,
individualistic societies are capable of accepting collective responsibility for
crimes in certain conditions, but that such an acceptance is usually found only in
situations where those that are also held liable had a reasonable degree of control
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Generally, collective responsibility considers the group as the moral
unit, not the individual. 83 Although concerned with blameworthiness,
this theory does not regard individual moral responsibility as an
absolute requirement of punishment. 184 Rather, individual moral
responsibility is merely the predominant characteristic of modem
individualistic societies. 185 A society that recognizes a less
individualistic ethic, with a focus on the clan or family, may find
certain applications of collective responsibility palatable and
uncontroversial.186 More importantly, if society does not regard the
individual as the absolute unit of moral accountability, then it may be
acceptable, under certain conditions, for the international community
to assign responsibility based on group membership. 187 If the
international community recognizes the justness of collective moral
responsibility, then a respect for the individual as an individual is not
1 88
as necessary.
over the other's actions and where there is a known limitation to where the group
liability ends).
183. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 233 (1970) (describing collective liability as "the vicarious
liability of an organized group" including "a loosely organized, impermanent
collection or a corporate institution").
184. C.f LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 76 (1987) (taking
a "middle position" in which collective moral responsibility to groups of persons is
not sufficient for the ascription of individual moral responsibility).
185. See FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 240 (comparing present day
individualistic societies, in which the public expects individual privacy, with more
collective societies of the past, where group membership was necessary for
survival at the expense of privacy).
186. See Waley-Cohen, supra note 92, at 127 (discussing Chinese law and
noting that the influence of traditional notions of criminal collective responsibility
are still present in modem law due to the deeply ingrained concepts of family and
community responsibility).
187. See FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 240-41 (suggesting that imposing
collective criminal liability on groups as a mandatory self-policing device is not
reasonable because it is no longer an acceptable form of social organization).
188. See J.R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 77 (1993) (explaining that, despite its
appeal, this theory is problematic because it is difficult to determine the limits of
collective responsibility). While this lack of clear limits does not necessarily
invalidate collective responsibility as a theory of liability that, in some sense,
respects moral responsibility, the inability to draw principled limitations on the
scope of liability should trouble international lawmakers. Id.
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A third explanation for the development of a command
responsibility doctrine that fails to meet fundamental culpability
principles is that individual accountability for international crimes is a
relatively new genre of international law. While Nuremberg created
the precedent for individual accountability,'8 9 international law has yet
to incorporate the type of intensive philosophical discussion regarding
justness that should permeate the creation of command responsibility
in international criminal law. 190 One commentator has noted that there
is "little evidence that the compatibility of imputed command
responsibility with the culpability principle has received much
attention" in recent deliberations surrounding international criminal
jurisdiction.' 9' Therefore, while most national criminal systems may
adhere to the general idea that people should be held responsible
according to their own actions, 192 international law neglects to
adequately account for this maxim.

CONCLUSION
Irrespective of which explanation is most compelling, the recent
development of a permanent international criminal court and the
emergence of aggressive universal jurisdiction for certain international
crimes requires that the international community now give greater
attention to justifying the law.193 The imposition of punishment upon
individuals requires that international law move beyond a mere
189. See WOETZEL, supra note 17, at 6 (recounting the Nuremburg trials of Nazi
war criminals for their individual violations of international law during World War

II).
190. See Damaska, supra note 7, at 456 (alleging that the international
lawmaking community has failed to address the inherent inconsistencies of the
command responsibility doctrine with existing principles of local criminal laws).
191. See id. at 495 (remarking that before international lawmakers solidify
permanent institutions of international criminal justice, they must first end their
"acoustic isolation from their brethren working the vein of municipal criminal law"
in order to adequately address the inconsistencies between command responsibility
and doctrines of criminal culpability).
192. See id. at 463-64 (citing the ingrained principle of individual culpability in
national criminal systems as the reason why command responsibility laws are not
enforced outside of international criminal law).
193. See id. at 457 (noting that the ability to understand and explain the law will
"remove perceptions of undue severity, disarm local opponents of international
justice, and increase the legitimacy of international judicial bodies").
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consent-based positivism, and instead move toward a more reflective
approach that incorporates some moral compass in law creation.
Without a more reflective approach, a discord between principles and
law could erode the international criminal justice system's
credibility.194
This more reflective approach does not require a wholesale
abandonment of positivism, or a rejection of the dynamic of
compromise. International lawmakers have found these influences too
deeply-entrenched in current conceptions of international law for them
to easily disregard. '91 Rather, international lawmakers should
continuously concern themselves with advancing an understanding of
a common philosophy of law, even as the reality of international
lawmaking recognizes the need for a certain degree of ideological
flexibility. At a minimum, this requires that lawmakers begin to
identify and accurately describe problematic philosophical issues
rather than see these issues "passed over in silence or masked by
rhetorical legerdemain." 196 This identification will provide the
necessary dialectic framework for rehabilitating international criminal
law.
In the short term, this recognition process will only result in legal
doctrines such as command responsibility, that are both objectionable
and desirable at the same time. 97 However, the objectionable aspects

194. See id. at 470-71 (predicting that, as institutions of international criminal
tribunals begin to institute judgments based on command responsibility,
punishment without individual culpability will offend the public's moral intuitions
concerning guilt and create a backlash against the international criminal justice
system).
195. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text (summarizing
international lawmakers' dynamic compromise between retribution and other goals
of criminal justice that shape the creation of international legal principles in the
establishment of the governing objectives of international criminal courts, such as the
ICTY and the ICC).
196. See Damaska, supra note 7, at 456 (claiming that the only way to address
the conflict between national and international criminal law is to recognize their
existence and allow international judges to "adequately explain the grounds,
perhaps even the necessity, for the departures from [national] legal principles").
197. See supra notes 177-181 and accompanying text (conveying that the
legitimate goals of deterrence and punishment in international criminal law cannot
always coexist without intruding upon some intuitive principles of criminal law,
such as individual culpability).
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should not diminish or discourage the long-term efforts of
international lawmakers towards the creation of a coherent and
principled system of international justice. By adopting a measured
approach, lawmakers can create a legal system that will eventually
meet the dictates of a deontological retributive theory of law.
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